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Most people seem to have the intuition that self-deception is always and 
obviously wrong. In this thesis, I make the case that under certain 
circumstances, self-deception can actually do a great deal of good and ought 
to be morally permissible – especially in cases where it would be life-
threatening, dehumanizing, or cruel to insist on complete authenticity. I argue 
that self-deception can be rational and that it can also sometimes be morally 
permissible to allow the self-deception of others to go unchallenged, 
especially in cases where the opportunity to exercise compassion, empathy, 
and kindness towards each other takes precedence over a concern for truth. I 
then confront self-deception’s staunchest opponents, the Existentialists, who 
maintain that self-deception is never morally permissible because it conflicts 
with their supreme value, authenticity. I focus specifically on the work of 
Nietzsche and Sartre and identify the various problems that arise from their 
objections to self-deception. I conclude this thesis with some suggestions as to 
why so many people might have come to believe that authenticity is the 
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“Take the life-lie away from the average man and straight 
away you take away his happiness”.  –Henrik Ibsen 
 
Most people seem to have the intuition that self-deception is always and 
obviously wrong, even if they can’t always put their finger on why. We react 
to it on a gut level and feel that something must be amiss—surely it can’t be 
okay to deceive, even if we are just deceiving ourselves. My intuition, 
however, is somewhat different, and this thesis is dedicated to making the case 
that under certain circumstances, self-deception can do a great deal of good, 
contributing to our physical and mental well-being and ought to be morally 
permissible, especially in cases where it would be life-threatening, 
dehumanizing, or cruel to insist on complete authenticity. I also argue two 
further distinct yet related points. The first is that the opportunity to exercise 
compassion, empathy, and kindness towards each other by sometimes 
allowing another person’s self-deception to go unchallenged can sometimes 
also be a moral good and outweigh the important of a concern for truth. The 
second is that it can sometimes be immoral to try to disabuse a person of the 
false beliefs they hold, as self-deception can give human beings the hope and 
meaning that they need in their lives to survive and thrive, and attacking, or 
trying to remove another person’s self-deception can be disastrous.  
 
In Chapter One, I begin by making the case that self-deception is indeed a real 




scholars have rejected that it is even possible. I define what we mean when we use 
the term ‘self-deception’ and also look at the role that consciousness plays in most 
discussions of the morality of self-deception. I then discuss the problem of 
paradoxes, applying an argument developed by Herbert Fingarette to try to 
resolve the epistemological dichotomies that the concept of self-deception seems 
to raise.   
 
In Chapter Two, I argue that self-deception can be rational if we take a means-
ends view of rationality and emphasize its usefulness in serving legitimate, 
non-harmful desires, wants, needs, and values other than those involved in a 
concern for truth. I then make the case that under certain circumstances it can 
be morally permissible to deceive oneself, especially when the deception is 
contributing to one’s physical and mental well-being. I also argue that it can 
occasionally be morally permissible to allow the self-deception of others to go 
unchallenged, especially in cases where the opportunity to exercise 
compassion, empathy, and kindness towards each other takes precedence over 
a concern for truth. I then take the argument one step further and claim that 
attacking or trying to remove another person’s self-deception can at times 
itself be a moral wrong.  
 
In Chapter Three, I directly confront self-deception’s staunchest opponents, 
the Existentialists, who maintain that self-deception is never morally 




outline of the Existentialist position on authenticity and identify several 
problems that the position seems to raise, looking specifically at the work of 
two of the most influential writers on the subject, Jean Paul Sartre and to a 
lesser extent, Friedrich Nietzsche. The five difficulties I identify are: 1) the 
problem of absolute truth 2) the problem of absolute freedom 3) the problem 
of self-creation 4) the problem of dehumanizing expectations 5) the problem 
of decision-making being valued over consequences.  I then consider Sartre’s 
argument in support of his belief that all evasions of self-knowledge are 
conscious and explain why this point is so critical to his contentions that a) 
self-deceivers are morally responsible for their deceptions and b) that human 
beings are capable of living lives of complete authenticity. I conclude the 
chapter with some suggestions as to why so many people might have come to 
believe that authenticity is the supreme value, when a closer investigation 







Before I can begin my main project of exploring the moral dimensions of self-
deception, I must first make the case that self-deception is even possible. The 
issue raises a number of paradoxes so troubling that many scholars do not believe 
that the phenomenon is real. They are stymied by such questions as ‘how can one 
believe what one simultaneously knows to be false?’ and often conclude that what 
they are really looking at are mere cases of dishonesty or wishful thinking. In 
section one, I define what we mean when we use the term ‘self-deception’, as it is 
an expression that can take many varied forms and is often used in different ways 
in everyday language.  
 
Section two looks at the important role that consciousness plays in the 
literature of self-deception and lays the foundation for my discussion in 
Chapter Three of why Sartre rejects the moral permissibility of self-deception 
in any form. As we shall see, Fingarette’s understanding of self-deception 
relies heavily on the assumption that we are generally not conscious or aware 
of most of the things that we do, think, and feel, an idea rejected by most 
Existentialists (most notably Sartre) who believe that we always have access 






Section three discusses paradoxes and focuses on an argument presented by 
Herbert Fingarette that I believe resolves the epistemological dichotomies 
raised by the concept of self-deception and best explains how a self-deceiver 
can hold two contradictory thoughts at the same time without generating any 
paradoxes. This theory relies heavily on elements of Psychological (Mind) 
Partitioning and the existence of semi-autonomous sub-systems, a view also 





1. What Is Self-Deception? 
In Self-Deception and Self-Understanding, Mike W. Martin defines self-
deception as the purposeful or intentional evasion of self-acknowledgement. 
Deceiving oneself is the evasion of full self-acknowledgement of some truths 
or of what one would view as truth if one were to confront an issue squarely. 
The truths or apparent truths may concern oneself, others, one’s immediate 
situation, or the world at large, while the evasion may have any number of 
motives, although in general, what is evaded will be perceived as unpleasant 
or onerous in some way (Martin 1989).   
 
Self-deception can take many forms and is used in different ways in everyday 
language. Sometimes it can refer to purposeful and intentional conduct (like 
the actions we take in forming and sustaining projects of evasion), while at 
other times, it will refer to the mental states that result from the project of 
evading self-acknowledgement, such as false beliefs, unwarranted beliefs 
(whether true or false) absence of true beliefs, inappropriate emotions, 
unfitting attitudes, dispositions to self-pretence or ignoring, and emotional 
detachment (Rorty 1972). The term can also refer specifically to 
misconceptions about oneself and may be used either with negative 
connotations or in contexts where no derogatory appraisal is implied. And 
even when self-deceivers do manage to persuade themselves to hold false or 
unjustified beliefs, there are many variations in the manner in which the belief 





In addition to the varieties of self-deception which merely center on false 
beliefs, the following instances are also included: wilful ignorance (which can 
be simply the absence of true beliefs rather than the presence of false ones); 
systematic ignoring of something known, believed, or suspected (where 
ignoring may include both distraction of thoughts from a topic and 
disregarding evidence while reasoning); emotional detachment and attitudinal 
distortion; and self pretence (acting as if one believes, and typically trying to 
believe without succeeding, or trying to play a role or have emotions and 
attitudes that are not genuine) (Martin 1986).  
 
Self-deception presents us with several seemingly unsolvable problems. For 
example, how can one convince oneself to believe what one simultaneously 
knows to be false?  We are required to knowingly use our knowledge of the 
truth in the very attempt to make ourselves ignorant of it or to believe the 
opposite falsehood. This knowledge about the attempt to make ourselves 
ignorant would seem to subvert our efforts from the outset. In section three, 






2. Self-Deception and Consciousness 
It seems to me that the single most important question we need to ask 
ourselves when trying to determine if self-deception could be a real 
phenomenon (and therefore sometimes morally excusable) is whether or not it 
is possible to have an unconscious belief coexist with a seemingly 
contradictory conscious one. If the answer is yes, then the paradoxes that self-
deception seems to raise become easier to address and far less problematic. 
Questions of moral culpability also become easier to handle, as an awareness 
of one’s actions is usually a requirement for censure. If the answer is no – 
unconscious beliefs cannot coexist with contradictory conscious ones – then 
the paradoxes associated with self-deception are virtually unsolvable. This 
also means that the self-deceiver on some (accessible) level must be aware of 
his deception and is therefore morally culpable for his actions. Since this 
thesis concerns itself with the issue of the moral permissibility of self-
deception, this distinction becomes extremely important.  
 
In the next section, I discuss a theory developed by Herbert Fingarette which I 
believe is the most plausible explanation of what is really going on when we 
self-deceive. This theory relies heavily on the notion that self-deception 
occurs at the unconscious level, where the conscious individual has no access 
to what is going on within these other regions of his psyche. Seen in this way, 
the self-deceiver can be excused for his behaviour in that if he has no 




saying that he might not be morally responsible is not the same thing as saying 
he might not otherwise be responsible for any harm that his actions may cause 
to himself or to others; however, it does provide a defence of a sort against the 
attacks made by the Existentialists, discussed at length in Chapter Three, who 





3. Fingarette’s Theory and Solving Paradoxes  
Of all the theories that claim to justify how self-deception is possible, the one 
that seems the most plausible to me was put forth by Herbert Fingarette in his 
seminal work, Self-Deception, in which he was able to resolve the two most 
troubling paradoxes surrounding the issue: ‘intentional ignoring’ and how a 
self-deceiver can both ‘know and not-know’ at the same time. His main idea is 
that a self-deceiver—indeed, each of us—is a community of ‘subselves’, 
organized clusters of desires, attitudes, emotions, beliefs, and purposes, each 
of which can be expressed in semi-independence from other clusters as semi-
autonomous sub-systems. Psychological (Mind) Partitioning allows the self-
deceiver to hold two contradictory beliefs at the same time without resulting 
in any paradoxes, because the conflicting beliefs can exist in different parts of 
the mind that are capable of ‘ignoring’ each other. And this is precisely what 
happens in self-deception: a wider community of ‘selves’ shuns (or ‘ignores’) 
a ‘subself’ that is unacceptable to it (Fingarette 1969).   
 
Even if Psychological (Mind) Partitioning is possible and the human mind is 
made up of semi-autonomous sub-systems, we still need to explain how it is 
possible that certain thoughts can simply be ‘ignored’, or kept from becoming 
explicitly conscious. Interpersonal deceivers act on the basis of what they 
know in order to conceal certain facts from their victims. What is puzzling 
here is how the self-deceiver can use his knowledge or suspicions of some 




that the very act of forming the intention to ignore something – and the 
consciousness of the knowledge of what is to be concealed – would block the 
very effort to conceal it.  Further, the self-knowledge of the intention to 
conceal the truth would seem to thwart the project as well.  
 
According to Fingarette, acting intentionally requires acting knowingly but it 
does not require that this knowledge be constantly attended to; we engage in 
many intentional activities without deliberately attending to them. The 
intentions involved are typically not deliberately thought about with focused 
consciousness, nor constantly attended to with any degree of consciousness. 
Indeed, intentional ignoring entails having and using suspicions, beliefs, or 
knowledge about what is ignored but it does not entail bestowing any kind of 
ongoing attention to it. We have the capacity to distract our attention from 
things we sense, to selectively focus it elsewhere, and to disregard 
troublesome facts. Fingarette believes that one of the biggest mistakes people 
make is assuming that we are generally conscious and aware of most of the 
things we do, think, and feel. (As we shall see in Chapter Three, this is also 
Freud’s position, vehemently denied by Sartre). 
 
He tells us that instead of taking explicit consciousness for granted, we need 
to start taking its absence for granted and treating explicit consciousness as 
something that only happens when we exercise a ‘specific skill for a special 




awareness is our default position, and that explicit consciousness only springs 
into action when there is good reason for it to do so. As a result, most of our 
‘engagements in the world’ are not experienced with any kind of full 
consciousness. By ‘engagements in the world’, Fingarette means an 
individual’s conduct, aims, hopes, fears, perceptions, and memories, using the 
phrase in order to characterize in the most general terms, what someone does 
or what he undergoes as a human being: “it is how an individual finds and/or 
takes the world, including himself. It is also a matter of the activities he 
engages in, the projects he takes on, and the way the world presents itself to 
him to be seen, heard, felt, enjoyed, feared, or otherwise ‘experienced’ by 
him” (Fingarette 1969, 39). Anything that a person does not take account of, 
for whatever reason, is not part of his engagement in the world, although such 
a thing could have an effect on the course of his engagements, in one way or 
another.  
 
Among the various ways in which ‘conscious’ is used, Fingarette tells us that 
the one he selects is a close cousin to ‘explicitly aware’, or ‘attending 
explicitly to’. As he explains, “When I ride a bicycle, drive a car, form and 
utter sentences in English, dress myself, play the violin, sit down in a chair, 
walk, handle my body, I usually exercise these skills well, at times with art; 
yet most of the time I do not spell-out, not even to myself, what I am doing” 
(Fingarette 1969, 41).  The immediately crucial point that Fingarette wants to 




engagements in the world and that in order for us to be explicitly conscious of 
any one of these, we need to actively ‘spell-out’ what we are doing or 
experiencing, an act that Fingarette refers to as a special skill. For an 
individual to become explicitly conscious of something, he must either spell it 
out in general terms (“I am racing in a sailing contest”), or spell out some 
relevant feature of the engagement (“I am losing, my competitor’s boat is 
about to pass me”) (Fingarette 1969, 40).  He must also have good reason to 
do so. 
 
Once we acknowledge that we must have a special reason for spelling-out, we 
begin to realize that the skill of spelling-out must be larger in scope than the mere 
capacity to perform it; exercising the skill requires sizing up the situation in order 
to assess whether or not there is adequate reason for spelling-out a particular 
engagement. When confronted with a situation where there are reasons for both 
spelling-out and not spelling-out, presumably the individual will weigh these 
considerations against each other, and his decision to spell-out or not spell-out – 
or exactly how he will do so if he chooses to spell-out – will depend on his 
assessment of the situation as well as on his ingenuity in adapting to the 
conflicting considerations.  
 
Fingarette draws attention to the fact that using our ‘spelling-out’ skill is itself 
a way of being engaged in the world. It is something we do. As a result, 
spelling out is an activity which is not itself spelled-out, except when there is 




so, but occasionally there will be good cause. Fingarette gives the example of 
spelling-out one’s finger placement while practicing the violin, and also 
spelling out that one is spelling-out one’s finger placement. The occasion 
might be one in which the individual is so distractingly conscious of his finger 
placement as to lead him to become explicitly conscious that he is 
distractingly conscious of it.  
 
In a contrasting example, and the one of most direct interest to our 
investigation of self-deception, Fingarette describes a situation where there is 
overriding reason not to spell-out some engagement, where we “skilfully take 
account of this and systematically avoid spelling-out the engagement, and 
where, in turn, we refrain from spelling out this exercise of our skill in 
spelling-out” (Fingarette 1969, 42). In such a case, we avoid becoming 
explicitly conscious of our engagement while at the same time avoid 
becoming explicitly conscious that we are avoiding it. Fingarette believes that 
the person in self-deception is one who persistently avoids spelling-out some 
feature of his engagement in the world, even when it would normally be 
appropriate to do so.  
 
Sometimes we see this as an ‘inability’ to spell-out, that the self-deceiver is in 
some way ‘unable’ to admit to himself the truth, even though he knows in his 
heart that it is so. We believe that there is a kind of genuineness to his 




same time, we also feel that in some sense, he could admit the truth to himself 
if he only would. This inability to spell-out is not a lack of skill or strength, 
but rather it is the adherence to a tacitly adopted policy. The phrase ‘he cannot 
admit it, cannot let himself become conscious of it’ means in this case that he 
‘will not’. The ‘will not’, however, refers to a general policy commitment, and 
not to an ad hoc decision not to spell it out (Fingarette 1969, 43).   
 
Fingarette likens this to saying, “It’s not that I won’t come with you, it’s that I 
can’t because I promised Smith I’d go with him.” However, the ‘cannot’ of 
self-deception is quite different in one respect from the ‘cannot’ of the man 
who promised: while the one who promised cannot say yes, he can reveal that 
he is committed not to say yes; the self-deceiver, on the other hand, is 
committed to saying nothing on either score. As a result, he a) says nothing, 
i.e. does not spell-out the truth b) gives us the impression that ‘in some sense’ 
he could if he would c) also gives us the impression that he has somehow 
rendered himself incapable of doing it (Fingarette 1969, 46).  
 
Self-deception, then, is possible because human beings are rarely explicitly 
conscious of their engagements in the world. As a result, the self-deceiver is 
able to hold two contradictory beliefs at the same time without resulting in a 
paradox because he is able to simply ‘ignore’ the belief that he does not want 
to become explicitly conscious of. Psychological (Mind) Partitioning allows 
these conflicting thoughts to reside in different parts of the mind where they 




systems. In order for an individual to become explicitly aware of one of his 
engagements in the world, he must exercise the skill of spelling-out that 
engagement, which will only happen if he has good reason to do so. Needless 
to say, the self-deceiver is not likely to ever have good reason to become 
explicitly conscious of a belief that contradicts what he wants to believe, and 
as a result, he is able to maintain his dual roles of deceiver and deceived.   
 
A word should also be said about self-deception and moral paradoxes. 
Regarded as deceivers, self-deceivers seem guilty for their deception and any 
harmful effects, while as the deceived, they appear to be innocent victims. 
Viewed as liars, they appear to be insecure and dishonest, but viewed as 
victims of a lie, they appear sincere and honestly mistaken. As deceivers, they 
appear responsible and blameworthy for cowardly hypocrisy, but as the 
deceived, they seem deserving of compassion and help in gaining full 
awareness of the deception perpetrated on them. Fingarette believes that these 
moral paradoxes arise because of two erroneous assumptions: interpersonal 
deception is an appropriate general model for understanding the moral status 
of self-deception; and a simple moral appraisal of deceivers and their victims 
can be given (namely, that the deceiver is always guilty, responsible, 
insincere, blameworthy, whereas the person deceived is always an innocent 
victim, exculpated, not insincere, and deserving of compassion). According to 
him, both assumptions are false. Much interpersonal deception is morally 




Furthermore, victims of deceivers are neither always lacking in responsibility 
and guilt, nor always deserving of compassion and sympathy. Interpersonal 
deception cannot provide a simple, general moral model for self-deception 
because the moral status of interpersonal deception varies too much from case 
to case (Fingarette 1969). 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I argued that self-deception is indeed a real phenomenon, and 
explained how the paradoxes that seem to surround it can be resolved. I 
started by defining what we mean when we use the term ‘self-deception’, and 
then looked at the role consciousness plays in our understanding of self-
deception and the moral culpability (or lack thereof) of self-deceivers. I then 
explained how Herbert Fingarette’s theory about the interaction (and non 
interaction), of semi-autonomous sub-systems within the human mind can 
help resolve the paradoxes that self-deception seems to raise. 
 
Now that I have established that self-deception is indeed possible, I can move 
on to my main project of exploring its moral dimensions. In Chapter Two, I 
argue that certain kinds of self-deception are morally permissible under 
certain circumstances, especially in cases where it would be life-threatening, 
dehumanizing, or cruel to insist on complete authenticity. I also argued that it 
can occasionally be morally permissible to allow the self-deception of others 




compassion, empathy, and kindness towards each other takes precedence over 
a concern for truth. Finally, I make the claim that attacking or trying to 









In Chapter One, I address the question of whether or not self-deception is even 
possible, and determine that it is, indeed, a real phenomenon. While much of 
the philosophical literature concerns itself with the issues discussed in the 
previous chapter, less attention has been paid to its moral status.  In Chapter 
Two, I argue that self-deception can be both rational and morally permissible 
under certain circumstances. I begin the chapter by arguing that self-deception 
can be rational if we take a will-centered view of rationality, emphasizing its 
usefulness in serving legitimate, non-harmful desires, wants, needs, and 
values other than those involved in a concern for truth. If we understand that 
self-deception can be an important survival mechanism, then it becomes easier 
to see how self-deception could be a rational reaction to certain circumstances.  
 
I then make the case for the moral permissibility of some kinds of self-
deception, arguing that survival, as well as physical and mental well-being, 
are sometimes more important than a concern for truth and should take 
precedence over it under certain circumstances without penalty to the self-
deceiver’s moral standing. I show how self-deception can be an effective 
survival mechanism, capable of providing the hope and meaning necessary to 
satisfy certain essential psychological human needs that are fundamental to 
our physical and mental well-being. I also argue that it can occasionally be 




specifically in cases where the opportunity to exercise compassion, empathy, 
and kindness towards each other takes precedence over a concern for truth. In 
Section 3, I take the argument one step further and claim that attacking or 
trying to remove another person’s self-deception can at times itself be a moral 
wrong.  
 
I end the chapter by outlining what I believe are the two main reasons (in 
addition to the belief that self-deception is always irrational) why so many 
people intuitively feel that self-deception is always wrong and could never be 
morally permissible. These are the belief that self-deception is always harmful 
to others and/or to oneself, and the belief that authenticity is the supreme 
virtue. While it is possible that some of the following arguments could be used 
to justify other kinds of deception as well as self-deception, my focus here is 
strictly on the latter and should be understood as an explanation of the 
circumstances under which I believe it is morally permissible for an individual 
to deceive him or her self—not another.  




1. Is Self-Deception Rational? 
The standard objection to self-deception is that it is irrational. Rationality has 
been so closely linked with the pursuit of truth and the objective weighing of 
evidence that it seems almost impossible to conceive that self-deception could 
be rational. To ascribe self-deception to someone is to attribute to him an 
erroneous belief which it is unreasonable to have. Self-deception requires the 
purposeful avoidance, misinterpretation, manipulation, or suppression of 
evidence to corroborate one’s beliefs. How then, could it be rational?  If we 
take an evidence-based view of rationality, then it is not, for such a view holds 
that all evasion of evidence is irrational by definition.  
 
According to John Passmore, rational persons form beliefs in strict accordance 
with the best available evidence and then shape their conduct, emotions, and 
attitudes consistently with those beliefs. Rational persons also adopt the most 
effective means for meeting their goals, but it is assumed that the calculation 
of these means should be based on beliefs warranted by available evidence. 
On this view, self-deception is irrational because it constitutes an evasion of 
evidence or apparent truths (Passmore 1968). From this perspective, the idea 
that self-deception could be a legitimate good is heretical and implies a 
competing conception of rationality centered on usefulness in serving 
legitimate, non-harmful desires, wants, needs, and values other than those 





I would like to suggest that when self-deception serves rational desires or 
needs, it is rational to engage in it so long as there are no overriding negative 
consequences in doing so and as long as no better options are available. D.W. 
Hamlyn observed that “there is a sense in which self-deception may 
sometimes be the right policy, in that it may be the only way of maintaining a 
viable human life” (Hamlyn 1971). A concern for truth, he suggested, is not of 
paramount importance in all situations. In fact, a preoccupation with truth and 
avoiding self-deception can inhibit the spontaneous emotions on which 
important personal relationships depend, emotions like love and compassion. 
In a similar vein, Amelie Rorty described a dying doctor who deceives 
himself about his illness and thereby prevents himself from collapsing into 
despair. The doctor’s self-deception seems to nurture fresh capacities for love, 
optimism, and humour, in dealing with his ordeal and responding to the 
people who care for him. This illustration shows how “individual instances of 
self-deception can be beneficial and in some sense rational or at least canny” 
(Rorty 1972). Robert Audi also made an explicit and careful defence of the 
rationality of some self-deception that serves good ends claiming that self-
deception is rational whenever it “advances, better than readily available 
alternatives, the wants, or actions, at least not in a way that outweighs its 
contribution to realization of the person’s rational wants; and does not have an 





The idea that rationality is primarily about getting around in the world (known 
as a means-ends, or 'instrumental' view of rationality) is a dominant view of 
rationality in many domains and has achieved broad acceptance. It holds that 
the point of cognition/belief formation is in the end practical and that we 
believe things in order to help us navigate the world. Beliefs, then, ought to be 
assessed and deemed rational or irrational in relation to how well they help us 
get around in the world, and not on whether or not they are true. If we stop 
looking at self-deception as an obvious wrong that has no place in the life of a 
moral person, then we can start to see how it might, at times, function as a 





2. Self-Deception and Morality 
Now that we have established that self-deception can indeed be rational, we 
can turn our attention to its moral status. In the following section, I first 
address the question of whether or not it can ever be morally permissible to 
deceive oneself, and then I look at the question of whether or not it can ever 
be morally permissible to allow another person’s self-deception to go 
unchallenged. In the first case, I argue that self-deception should be morally 
permissible in circumstances where the self-deception is contributing to one’s 
physical and mental well-being. In the second case, I argue that it should be 
morally permissible to allow another person’s self-deception to go 
unchallenged in cases where the exercise of compassion, empathy, and 
kindness is a moral good that outweighs the importance of a concern for truth. 
 
2.1 Physical and Mental Well-Being 
Some of the arguments we saw in Section One in defence of the rationality of 
self-deception also appear here in defence of its moral permissibility 
suggesting that some of the factors that make it rational also play a role in 
making it moral. As we saw earlier, self-deception can sometimes be an 
important survival mechanism that can contribute to keeping us alive in a very 
real sense, and in such cases, our physical and mental well being ought to take 
precedence over a concern for truth. Not only is this a rational course of 
action, but I believe that it ought to be a morally permissible one too. Far from 




deception can be a legitimate means of bringing the hope and meaning into 
our lives that are so necessary for staying emotionally and physically healthy.  
 
The presence of hope and meaning in our lives can help calm the existential 
fears and anxieties that awareness of our human condition so often generate. 
For example, the inevitability and permanence of death  (our own death and 
that of others), can lead to feelings of powerlessness, fear, sadness, loneliness 
and pain and any belief that can offer us hope, even if we are deceiving 
ourselves, can lead to better mental and physical health. Patients often do 
better when they believe they will get well again, even if the science is against 
it. Beliefs that give us hope and meaning are also vital in helping us stave off 
anxiety and depression, as well as the physical manifestations that so often 
accompany those problems.  
 
Certain beliefs can also help us survive by keeping us from being careless 
with our lives and treating them as worthless and insignificant. Belief that 
there is a purpose to it all, that there is a reason why we suffer, that there is a 
reason for everything, that all things happen in accordance with some higher 
plan – for many people, these ideas and others like them, are necessary 
fictions. We cannot deny that we are going to die but we can deny that death 
is the end; we cannot deny that the world is full of suffering but we can 
believe that everything happens for a reason; we cannot deny that life is unfair 
but we can believe that the meek shall inherit the earth, or that science will 




people turn to in a storm; for others, it is faith in science. We look to our 
beliefs for reassurance and for strength and meaning, for guidance, and for 
direction and safety. Viewed in this way, self-deception might be one of the 
least harmful ways to satisfy important psychological needs while doing far 
less damage to our psyches than leaving these vital human needs unmet or 
allowing them to manifest into severe psychological disorders. 
 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that everyone who holds false beliefs is 
deceiving themselves; rather, I am saying that in cases where self-deception is 
at play, it is sometimes morally permissible for an individual to hold such 
beliefs if it is the only way in which he can attain the hope and meaning in his 
life that I have argued are so essential to our physical and mental well-being.  
       
2.2 Compassion, Empathy, and Kindness 
I have argued that a person’s survival as well as their physical and mental 
well-being are considerations that should sometimes take precedence over a 
concern for truth. In this section, I look at whether or not it is morally 
permissible to allow another person’s self-deception to go unchallenged on 
occasion and determine that it is – especially in cases where the exercise of 
compassion, empathy, and kindness becomes a moral good that outweighs the 
importance of a concern for truth. In some cases, attacking or trying to remove 




at length in Eugene O’Neil’s The Iceman Cometh and Henrik Ibsen’s The 
Wild Duck, two famous plays that will be familiar to some readers.   
 
In “Adaptivity and Self-Knowledge”, Amelie Rorty says, “Like programs for 
eradicating the vices, attempts at doing away with self-deception would 
damage habits that are highly adaptive. Those incapable of self-deception are 
probably also incapable of romantic love, certain sorts of loyalty, and 
dedication to causes that require acting slightly larger than life. While these 
gifts have their dangers, they have on occasion served us well” (Rorty 1975). 
There seems to be something inherently wrong and unsettling about wanting 
to take away from people the stories that give their lives so much meaning. 
There is something dehumanizing about the expectation that people ought to 
be morally obligated to face up to every truth of their lives, especially when 
those truths are about our existential condition, something that we can do 
nothing about – the inescapable facts of our life. As Sophocles wrote in 
Oedipus Rex, “How dreadful knowledge of the truth can be when there is no 
help in truth” (Sophocles 1996). Further, we ought to extend this kindness and 
tolerance to others in the hope that it might also be extended to us one day, 
should we ever need it to lighten our own burdens.  
 
Human beings believe all sorts of things, from the plausible to the impossible 
and in the spirit of being good and kind to each other, of living together in 




live and let live. We need to seriously consider the harm that can come from 
forcing another person to confront certain truths of his life when he is not 
psychologically prepared to do so. This is especially true when the facts are at 
odds with any beliefs he may have generated that are responsible for bringing 
hope and meaning into his life. Unfortunately, the circumstances of the real 
world cannot always provide these for us, and sometimes self-deception is the 
only way we can attain them.  
 
It must be said that it is a short step from justifying the indulgence of some 
self-deception in others to becoming complacent, indifferent, or patronizing. 
None of us is flattered to be regarded as unworthy of being presented with the 
truth (gently) as others see it. Further, there are often reasonable and non-self-
deceiving hopes that it would be preferable to support in others. The danger is 
that we might too often support the self-deception of others in order to avoid 
the difficulties that providing the truth might bring, even if the truth, offered 





3. Disabusing Other People of False Beliefs as a Moral Wrong 
In the previous section, I argued that it is sometimes morally permissible to 
allow another person’s self-deception to go unchallenged. In this section, I 
take the argument one step further and claim that it can actually be a moral 
wrong to try to disabuse a person of a false belief. My claim is not rooted in 
the value of autonomy or the problem of paternalism; rather, it is based on the 
harm principle and I argue that sometimes attacking or trying to remove the 
self-deception of another person can cause a great deal of harm that cannot be 
morally justified. This is especially true in cases where confronting the self-
deceiver with the truth has no chance of producing a positive result or helping 
them in any way.  
 
Consider the following example. A woman dying in the hospital believes that 
if she visualizes destroying the white blood cells in her body, she will be able 
to beat the cancer that doctors have told her is inoperable. She refuses to 
believe her prognosis and religiously practices visualization techniques 
throughout the day. She reads all the available books on the subject and 
explains to everyone who will listen that she can feel the cancer disappearing 
from her body. Her husband, however, is not a believer in new-age ‘science’ 
and refuses to go along with her self-deception that visualization exercises 
will cure her disease. Each time he visits, he tells her that her beliefs are 
childish and that she should come to terms with her impending death. The 




based on ‘real science’, the more determined he becomes to find books and 
articles to dispel her delusion. He provides her with the most up-to-date 
science on her disease and presses the point that she has only a 1% chance of 
survival. She tells him that she is going to survive; he tells her that she is not, 
and that she should stop deceiving herself. 
 
In this case, the husband’s insistence on truth for its own sake is likely doing 
great harm to his wife’s mental and physical well-being. She is desperate for 
any hope that her life is not coming to an end, and her husband’s attack on her 
self-deception is cruel, dehumanizing, and perhaps even life-threatening in 
that the woman’s beliefs, though false, may have been helping to prolong her 
life in some way. His unwillingness to be complicit in her self-deception has 
served no greater good than to allow him to uncompromisingly express what 
he believes is the truth of her condition. Even if the husband is mistaken 
because he has false beliefs about the efficacy of such visualization and is in 
this case merely asserting what is false, the fact remains that he believes his 
wife is in self-deception and is causing her a great deal of pain – and no good 
– by asserting what he believes, whether it be true or false.  
 
Consider another example. An atheist is trying to convince her religious 
grandfather on his deathbed that there is no God. He insists that there is, and 
that he will soon be reunited with his dead wife. She tells him that he is 




existence of God. There is no afterlife, this is all there is; there will be no 
reunion. As in the first case, it is hard to see this woman’s actions as anything 
other than cruel, even if she is merely asserting what is false (for there is no 
real proof for the existence or non-existence of God). In her mind she is 
attempting to dispel what she believes is her grandfather’s self-deception 
about the after-world but in the process, she has inflicted upon him a great 
deal of mental pain for reasons that could only be described as selfish. The 
real harm, it seems to me, is in trying to take away from a person a belief that 
gives them so much comfort; committing such an act in the name of 
authenticity rings more like a moral crime, a dehumanizing act of cruelty, than 
an act of moral goodness. Disabusing a person of a false belief when it will 





4. Two Reasons Why We Think Self-Deception is Wrong 
In the next section, I identify two factors (in addition to the belief that self-
deception is always irrational) that I believe have contributed greatly to the 
common perception that self-deception is always morally wrong. The first is 
the widespread belief that self-deception is always harmful to the deceiver 
and/or to others, and the second is the belief that authenticity is the supreme 
value.  
 
4.1 Belief that Self-Deception Causes Harm 
The most common objections to self-deception are based on the harm 
principle, the idea that harm is always caused to oneself and/or to others 
through the action. In this section, I address the claim that self-deception is 
harmful to the deceiver and/or to others, insofar as holding a false belief is 
concerned, and then I respond to the charge that the act itself (rather than the 
specific content of the deception),  is harmful to the deceiver and/or to others. 
 
4.1.1 Holding False Beliefs Is Harmful to the Deceiver and/or to Others 
In his book, The Morality of Self-Deception, Mike W. Martin identifies 
several traditions of thought that address the various issues surrounding the 
morality of self-deception.  The group that is most concerned with self-
deception as it relates to harm, is what he calls the ‘Inner Hypocrisy 
Tradition’ (his term). This group is primarily concerned with how self-




facts and character flaws, making him a contemptible, culpable cheat who 
corrupts his own moral understanding, and harms others in the process. This 
tradition’s Derivative Wrong Principle states that self-deception often leads 
to, threatens to lead to, or supports immorality, and when it does, it is wrong 
in proportion to the immorality involved (Martin 1986). According to 
Aquinas, a natural member of this tradition, “Ignorance is sometimes 
directly and intrinsically voluntary, as when one freely chooses to be 
ignorant so that he may sin more freely” (Aquinas 1969).  
 
Evading self-acknowledgement of our faults enables us to avoid painful moral 
emotions such as guilt and remorse for harming others, shame for betraying 
our own ideals, or self-contempt for not meeting even our minimal 
commitments. Self-deception can also shield us from the recognition of 
something that we really should be, morally, attending to. There are also cases 
where the harm is self-inflicted by the self-deceiver and we can imagine 
instances where what is being cloaked by the self-deception is, in addition to 
being a problem in the agent’s character and conduct, a problem primarily to 
the agent, such as a drug addiction or a serious health issue (Martin 1986).   
 
As previously stated, I do not defend all types of self-deception. To be clear, I 
do not defend any type of self-deception that generates a false belief, or 
beliefs, that causes any reasonable measure of harm to come to the deceiver or 




serious negative consequences, but instead generates a false belief, or beliefs, 
that serves to protect the self-deceiver from a certain truth or truths that the 
awareness of could cause the person serious psychological and/or physical 
harm, and possibly even be life-threatening.  
 
4.1.2 The Act of Self-Deception is Harmful to the Deceiver and/or to 
Others 
Self-deception is often criticized on the grounds that it undermines one’s 
agency. When it does so, it does so gradually, and in two ways. First, it can 
become a habit or strategy that one continues to fall back upon. More 
worrisome, as Marcia Baron writes in her article, ‘What is Wrong with Self-
deception?’, it often requires further self-deception to be effective: 
“Generally, I want to claim, insofar as self-deception is wrong, it is wrong 
because it corrupts our belief-forming process. The effect is gradual. We 
allow our wishes that things be a certain way to play an increasingly dominant 
role in shaping how we see the world” (Baron 1992). 
 
When the motivation for the self-deception does not disappear, it frequently 
gains momentum. As with most projects, from writing a paper, to quashing a 
popular insurgent movement in Latin America, to deceiving oneself into 
believing p, the more one invests in it, the less willing one is to abandon the 
project. The more one structures one’s beliefs and attitudes so as to avoid 




But not to quit usually entails further evasion, ignoring, and reinterpretation of 
what would otherwise be counterevidence. Self-deception also spreads simply 
by becoming a familiar and useful strategy and by eroding tendencies to open-
minded reflection and to self-scrutiny (Baron 1992).  
 
Baron’s main objection is that every instance of self-deception runs the risk of 
being repeated and eventually turning into a habit. The implication is that if 
we could offer some guarantee that the behaviour would never be repeated, 
then some self-deception might be permissible. Framed in this way, it is easy 
to see the problem with Baron’s reasoning: if a case of self-deception is 
morally justifiable once, then it should make no difference to its moral 
standing if it recurs multiple times, or is an isolated event. Further, the number 
of deceptions required to support the core deception should not be of any 
consequence either, so long as each individual deception has met the 
requirements set for moral permissibility. Lastly, we have no grounds to 
assume that such a self-deceiver will continue to self-deceive at a later time, 
for another purpose, once his original sanctioned psychological or physical 
need has been met. Baron’s arguments may be effective in defending against 
certain kinds of self-deception but they fare less well when the self-deception 





4.2 Belief that Authenticity is the Supreme Value 
Our intuitions often tell us that there can be nothing more important than truth 
and that any negative consequences that come as a result of our pursuit or 
utterance of the truth is unfortunate, yet justified. We visit psychiatrists who 
promise to help us uncover and confront the ‘truth’ about ourselves, and we 
have long equated acceptance of the truth with courage. When we see people 
deceiving themselves, such as in cases of substance abuse, it is not surprising 
that self-deception seems obviously wrong in that it is helping us avoid some 
aspect of reality that we really ought to be facing up to. We have a sense that 
telling the truth, that truth itself, honesty, are all good things, and we are 
accustomed to trusting our commitment to it. Indeed, philosophers are 
particularly guilty of this, with the typical line being that self-deception is 
irrational, irrationality is bad, and therefore so too is self-deception.  
 
Self-deception disturbs us because it calls into question the purity of this 
commitment, and of our search for self-understanding and insight into the 
world. Living a life of pure authenticity, however, appears to conflict with 
what seems reasonable in practice. Most of us understand that under certain 
circumstances, it is okay to tell a lie – we do it regularly with children to 
protect them from certain realities and truths that we deem them too young to 
understand. We also lie to the elderly, the sick, and the dying, all out of what 
we think is a sense of kindness and compassion, concealing from them the 
truths of their fate. We understand intuitively that there is something 




disease is terminal, or offering arguments against the existence of God to a 
man waiting on his deathbed to be reunited in a Christian heaven with his 
dead wife.  
 
We understand these kinds of deceptions intuitively and even encourage them. 
The question is why can’t we extend the same understanding to the lies we tell 
ourselves? Perhaps it is the kind of examples that spring so readily to mind 
when we think of self-deception that derail us in our initial attempts to justify 
it. We have heard of the alcoholic who refuses to acknowledge his problem, 
the mother who denies that her child is autistic, and the woman who can’t 
accept that her husband is never coming back. We pass judgment easily, 
accusing such people of cowardice and an inability to face the truth, vilifying 
them for causing damage to others along the way, the innocent victims of their 
denial. Familiar cases such as these make it easy to dismiss self-deception as 
an obvious wrong, but these examples don’t tell the whole story. When we 
start to dig a little deeper, the intrinsic wrongness of self-deception becomes 
less clear.  
 
Existentialists are the main champions of the idea that truth is the supreme 
value, and make up the bulk of the writers in the ‘Authenticity Tradition’, 
another tradition in the literature of self-deception identified by Mike Martin. 
They object to self-deception on the grounds that decisions must be made in a 




significant features of the human condition, one’s immediate situation, and 
one’s personal responses (Martin 1986). While they differ over what these 
features are, they always select those intimately connected with all aspects of 
meaningful life, like freedom, personal responsibility, death, individuality, 
and personal fulfillment. This leads them to trace virtually all evasions of self-
acknowledgement to fundamental evasions of significant truths about these 
features. The result is that all self-deception is to be condemned with the same 
intensity used to focus on their one value – authenticity (Seymour 1997).   
 
In the next chapter, I further support my contention that authenticity is not the 
supreme value by mounting a direct challenge to the Existentialists, looking 
specifically at the work of two of the most influential writers on the subject, 
Jean Paul Sartre and Friedrich Nietzsche, in order to identify and address the 






In Chapter Two, I argued that under certain circumstances, self deception is 
morally permissible and should take precedence over a concern for truth. I 
reasoned that in some cases, our survival, as well as our mental and physical 
well-being is more important than authenticity, as is the opportunity to 
exercise compassion, empathy, and kindness towards each other by allowing 
another person’s self-deception to occasionally go unchallenged. In Chapter 
Three, I confront self-deception’s staunchest opponents, the Existentialists, 
who maintain that self-deception is never morally permissible under any 
circumstances. Self-deception (indeed any evasion of self-knowledge, which 
is the same thing for them) is to be utterly condemned in the pursuit of their 
highest value, authenticity.  In this chapter, I examine their justifications for 
maintaining such a rigid position and argue that much of their reasoning 
cannot stand up to scrutiny.  
 
I begin the chapter with a general outline of the Existentialist position on 
authenticity and identify several problems that the position seems to raise, 
looking specifically at the work of two of the most influential writers on the 
subject, Jean Paul Sartre and to a lesser extent, Freidrich Nietzsche. The five 
difficulties I identify are: 1) the problem of absolute truth 2) the problem of 
absolute freedom 3) the problem of self-creation 4) the problem of 




over consequences.  In Section 3, I look at Sartre’s argument in support of his 
belief that all evasions of self-knowledge are conscious and explain why this 
point is so central to his view that self-deceivers are morally responsible for 
their deceptions. I also explain how this point accounts for Sartre’s belief that 
human beings are capable of living lives of complete authenticity. I conclude 
the chapter with some suggestions as to why so many people might have come 
to believe that authenticity is the supreme value, when a closer investigation 





1. Existentialism and Authenticity 
Many Existentialists including Kierkegaard, Camus, Sartre, and Nietzsche 
have dedicated their central works to the idea that authenticity is the supreme 
value. For them, authenticity is defined in terms of avoiding self-deception 
with this emphasis leading to intensified criticism of virtually all forms of 
self-deception as cowardly and dishonest. They criticize it not as a derivative 
wrong but as the primary or only wrong, which correspondingly transforms 
the avoidance of self-deception from a limited and secondary duty into the 
paramount virtue. They believe that decisions must be made in a fully honest 
way, based on a courageous willingness to acknowledge the significant 
features of the human condition, of one’s immediate situation, and of one’s 
personal responses (Martin 1986). This leads them to trace virtually all 
evasions of self-acknowledgement to fundamental evasions of significant 
truths about these features. The result is that virtually all self-deception is to 
be condemned, and condemned with the same intensity used to focus on the 
ultimate value - authenticity. Even extreme cases, such as those I argued for in 
Chapter Two, are not exempt.  
 
If Existentialism didn’t reject all self-deception unconditionally, then there would 
be no need for this chapter. Most reasonable people would agree that a concern 
for truth is a good and noble pursuit, and that authenticity has an important role to 
play in the life of a moral person. What makes the Existentialist position so 




Chapter Two, I presented what I believe to be a reasonable case in support of a 
certain kind of self-deception that I argue is morally permissible under certain 
circumstances and conditions. I believe that I have struck the right balance 
between a regard for truth and respect for other values, such as survival and one’s 
physical and mental well-being, but even if my analysis leaves room for debate 
over exactly where the lines of permissibility should be drawn, I maintain that any 
reasonable position concerning our moral obligation towards authenticity has to 
allow for a certain amount of self-deception, no matter how narrow the 
parameters may be. 
 
The problem with authenticity in the way that the Existentialists have imagined it 
is that it is largely theoretical, allowing it to function well on paper while falling 
significantly short in its real world applications. In theory, we are free to assume 
that complete authenticity is possible, but in practice, this does not seem to be the 
case. In theory, approaching life in an entirely honest way may seem simple (and 
desirable) enough, but in practice, many of the truths of our lives are not as easy 
to confront as we might at first think they are. Further, doing so can sometimes 
lead to severe psychological trauma. The idea that truth for its own sake is a 
powerful enough motivator (or even reward) to permanently subordinate our 
desire to self-deceive is simply unrealistic. This point of view represents an 
idealism that flows freely through the Existential position on authenticity, 






2. Problems with the Existentialist Position on Authenticity 
In this section, I identify several problems that the Existential position on 
authenticity seems to raise. The first is the problem of absolute truth. If there 
is no such thing as an objective moral value, then what can justify the claim 
that authenticity is the supreme virtue? The second is the problem of absolute 
freedom. Since we are influenced at least to some degree by factors beyond 
our control, our freedom to choose cannot be as absolute as many 
Existentialists would have us believe (especially Sartre, as we shall see). The 
third difficulty is the problem of self-creation. If it is true that I have ultimate 
freedom to self-create, then why can’t I choose to be inauthentic, even if this 
simply means being less vigilant in my pursuit of truth from time-to-time and 
allowing myself to be persuaded by bad arguments? The fourth problem we 
encounter is the fact that trying to do away with all forms of self-deception 
can be dehumanizing. As I argued in Chapter Two, much good can come from 
certain kinds of self-deception, including allowing us to exercise kindness, 
compassion, and empathy towards each other by letting another person’s self-
deception go unchallenged from time to time. The final problem we encounter 
is the dangerous assumption that decision-making is more important than 
resulting consequences. What follows is a detailed discussion of each, with 
specific references to the work of Jean Paul Sartre and Freidrich Nietzsche. 
 




Most Existentialists deemphasize or attack the very possibility of objective 
moral values, as do Nietzsche and Sartre. Nietzsche does not believe in 
absolute truth and thinks that the death of God (which he proclaimed in The 
Gay Science) is further proof of this. It is belief in God that had, in the first 
place, encouraged the illusion of universal and absolute truths that people 
believed they were bound to accept. Just as there are no absolute truths about 
the world, so too there are no absolute truths about morality. Instead, all our 
beliefs are nothing more than so many interpretations or ‘perspectives’, ways 
we have of looking at the world. “There are many kinds of eyes. Even the 
sphinx has eyes—and consequently there are many kinds of ‘truths’, and 
consequently there is no truth" (Nietzsche 1968, 291).  
 
In Nietzsche’s view, moral ideas are the simple result of human self-interest 
and the evolutionary urge to survive. ‘Truths’ are only more or less useful, 
and should not be thought of in terms of true or false, or right or wrong. “How 
is truth proved?  By the feeling of enhanced power – by utility – by 
indispensability. In short, by advantages (Nietzsche 1968, 249). Nietzsche has 
essentially given us the right to create our own truths, as they help us achieve 
power over the world and each other. His fundamental point is that morality 
cannot be based upon reason alone, or if it is, then my reason may not be the 
same as yours. Each of us must decide our own virtues.  
 
Like Nietzsche, Sartre too did not believe in absolute truths or objective moral 




unique foundation of values and that nothing, absolutely nothing, justifies me 
in adopting this or that particular value . . .” (Sartre 1966, 76). Conduct, 
commodities, and people are valuable only because we decide to give them 
worth. It is a primary form of self-deception to believe that they make 
objective, justifiable claims on us that obligate us to make these commitments.  
According to Sartre, most of us engage in this form of bad faith because it is 
anguishing to acknowledge that we have ultimate freedom to create our own 
values. It is also anguishing to acknowledge our freedom from having a 
rational foundation for our values.  
 
The problem here is that both Nietzsche and Sartre claim that there is no such 
thing as an objective moral value, yet we have already learned that they 
consider authenticity to be the supreme virtue. If we accept that there are no 
predetermined moral values, then on what grounds are we to accept their 
secondary claim that authenticity is the supreme virtue? Both assertions 
cannot be true. Further, if there is no such thing as preset moral values, then 
authenticity might not even be a virtue at all, let alone the most important one. 
A second but related problem is the question of why we should accept their 
point of view over anyone else’s. If we are free to create our own values, then 
we are under no obligation to accept any value that we have not created for 
ourselves. It might be a value for Nietzsche or Sartre, but that does not justify 





Sartre himself acknowledges that “. . . as soon as there is a commitment, I am 
obliged to will the liberty of others at the same time as my own. I cannot make 
liberty my aim unless I make that of others equally my aim” (Sartre 2007). 
Yet this ‘liberty of others’ seems to exclude allowing them to be inauthentic. 
Sartre places a condition on our freedom which he is never able to justify. 
Interestingly, he never attempts to defend authenticity itself, essentially 
sidestepping the issue. While this is consistent with his view that no value, not 
even authenticity, is justified by objective reasons that obligate us to commit 
ourselves to them, this evasion conveniently allows him to avoid contradicting 
himself and getting tripped up by his own words. 
 
2.2 The Problem of Absolute Freedom 
Many of the problems extant in the Existentialist position on authenticity can 
be traced back to the questionable assumption that our freedom to choose is 
absolute. The assumption is that we always have ultimate control over the 
extent to which we are authentic or inauthentic, and by extension, whether or 
not our decisions are conscious or unconscious. There are two separate and 
distinct problems that arise from this assumption. The first is that the entire 
Existential position on authenticity is based on the dubious belief that 
complete authenticity – and by extension, the avoidance of all self-deception –
is even possible. What follows from this premise is the inevitable moral 




the ‘fact’ that such actions could have been avoided. (Section Four of this 
chapter deals with Sartre’s reasoning for this). 
 
Sartre tells us that, “We are free from complete causal determination of our 
consciousness. There are, of course, limits or constraints on how we may act 
but these constraints do not force us to think or act in any one way. They 
merely comprise the hard facts – the “facticity” – that specify the situation to 
which we respond with complete freedom” (Sartre 1966, 621).  We are free to 
interpret the world and our lives to give them significance (both value and 
intelligibility in terms of values). This significance is expressed in detail 
through our emotions and attitudes, which, in Sartre’s view, we also choose. 
Each moment of consciousness is an act of interpreting what we are conscious 
of – what we perceive, conceive, imagine, feel, respond to, and so on (Martin 
1986). 
 
On the contrary, modern science has contributed greatly to our understanding 
that ‘free will’ does not exist in a vacuum, and that human beings are 
significantly influenced in our decision-making processes by physical, 
psychological, and circumstantial factors.  Our freedom to choose is not, and 
never has been, absolute, even if we are still uncertain as to how all the pieces 
of the puzzle fit together, and to what extent, if any, our decisions are ever 
really within our control. Many of the difficulties we encounter with Sartre are 




controlled. This also explains why he believes that it is possible for human 
beings to be fully authentic. (For a more detailed discussion of Sartre’s 
reasoning on this point, please see Section Four). 
 
The second problem that arises from the assumption that we have absolute 
freedom in our ability to choose is the emergence of an irreconcilable conflict 
between essentialist and non-essentialist elements. In Being and Nothingness, 
the thoughtful reader will recognize that Sartre has created a dilemma for 
himself that is never satisfactorily resolved. He famously proclaims that 
‘existence precedes essence’ (Sartre 1957, 438), and denies that there is any 
fixed or pre-given human nature, rejecting the possibility of any inherent 
limitations on our freedom. Our actions are not the determined effects of 
instincts, drives, desires or any other aspect of our natural being but are the 
products of free and purely individual choice. While Sartre never denies that 
human beings have drives, needs, and desires that influence us – such factors 
set the conditions in which we must choose – he maintains that they never 
completely determine the outcome of our choices: our freedom to choose is 
absolute and exists in all conditions and in all situations (Sartre 1948). 
 
Sartre tells us that we are ‘condemned to be free’ (Sartre 1957, 439) and 
although he locates the true self in choice rather than instinct, in will rather 
than drive, and in the mental rather than the physical realm, his account of the 




though it portrays just one aspect of the self – will, choice, commitment – as 
essential. It identifies the true self with simple, immediate, and purely 
individual free choice. Conversely, it regards desires, instincts, and physical 
needs as external to the true self and inessential (Sayers 2009). His assertion 
that there is no such thing as human nature is a contradiction to his claim that 
freedom is a characteristic, or property which all human beings must possess.  
 
For the later to be true, there must be at least one aspect of human nature. To 
say that there is no preset meaning, or purpose to life is one thing, but to 
claim, as he does, that ‘existence precedes essence’ is simply wrong if he 
wants to say that we are all born with absolute freedom to choose. The result 
is an equally simplistic and one-dimensional picture of human psychology. Up 
to a point, it is possible to hold one’s needs and instincts in check by force of 
will, but to attempt to deny them altogether is to repudiate essential bodily 
aspects of human nature and ultimately to negate life itself (Sayers 2009). 
This view leads Sartre to overestimate how free human beings really are when 
it comes to being in control of our emotions and how we respond to the 
demands of our lives. He largely ignores important aspects of our humanity, 
such as psychological, physical, and emotional needs and does not 
acknowledge that evolution and our environment have shaped us into certain 
kinds of creatures that have certain kinds of needs and limitations. Sartre 
claims as significant truths certain assumptions that he alleges any rational 




1986). The trouble is that some of these assumptions could not be more 
controversial, especially his extreme insistence that consciousness is free from 
causal determination and that no values are rationally defensible. Genes, 
biology, experience, and circumstance all have a role to play in shaping who, 
what, and how we are, and I believe that the failure to acknowledge this, along 
with the companion assumption that our freedom is absolute, is in large part 
responsible for many of the problems that arise from the Existentialist position 
on authenticity.  
 
2.3 The Problem of Self-Creation 
Another problem we find in Sartre is the conflict that arises between 
authenticity and our right to self-create. Sartre believes that the death of God 
means that there is no such thing as human nature because there is no God to 
create it. Without a human nature, we are free to be what we choose. There is 
nothing we ought to do since there is nothing we ought to be.  There are no 
absolutes, no norms or right behaviour – we are on our own. We exist; 
whatever is uniquely ours, whatever makes each of us an individual – our 
essence – is ours for the making. We do not discover who we are so much as 
we make ourselves (Sartre 1966). We are free to approach the world in certain 
general ways, such as rationally vs. irrationally, benevolently vs. selfishly, 
free within limits to pursue our goals and to modify the world so as to increase 
our options, free to interpret the world and our lives, to give them 




to acknowledge or evade acknowledging facts about the world and ourselves, 
including facts about how we have chosen to interpret and commit ourselves. 
Inauthenticity is essentially the evasion of our responsibility for our 
interpretation of the world, a responsibility that falls to us and to nobody else 
and is, in Sartre’s view, one that we are morally obligated to accept (Sartre 
1966).  
 
If we are truly free, however, it seems reasonable that we might choose to 
reject this responsibility. The choice to be inauthentic, to perhaps value 
pleasure, or peace-of-mind over truth ought to be just as valid as any other 
choice. If there are no predetermined ways in which we ought to live, then 
how can any choice, including the choice to self-deceive, be wrong? If my 
right to self-create is absolute, then what can justify any preconditions being 
placed on my freedom? Self-deception ought to be as permissible as any other 
choice a person might make, perhaps even more so considering its proven 
ability to help us survive, especially when the self-deception is a last resort in 
coping with a difficult situation, or a stopgap in dealing with a crisis.  
 
I have used the word ‘choice’ several times in my objections and realize that 
this requires some clarification. Suggesting that it is possible to ‘choose’ to 
deceive oneself implies that the action can be consciously willed, something 
that I have argued against in Chapter One. To be clear, I only use this 




inauthenticity is a choice. If they did not, how could they hold us morally 
responsible for it? Their intolerance carries with it the belief that the self-
deceiver is culpable for his or her own deception.  
 
If further proof is needed for the contempt that Sartre felt for self-deceivers, 
one need look no further than the following quote: “In the name of that will to 
freedom, which is implied in freedom itself, I can form judgments upon those 
who seek to hide from themselves the wholly voluntary nature of their 
existence and its complete freedom, those who hide from this total freedom in 
a guise of solemnity or with deterministic excuses, I shall call cowards. 
Others, who try to show that their existence is necessary, when it is merely an 
accident of the appearance of the human race on earth – I shall call scum” 
(Sartre 2007). Self-deception is wrong because all failures of self-knowledge 
are wrong.  Sartre believes that if you hide behind religion or determinism, 
you are ‘scum’ because you have not acknowledged your own freedom. What 
Sartre never considers is that there might be people who actually do 
acknowledge their freedom, but choose to exercise it by rejecting authenticity 
in favour of allowing themselves to be self-deceived in exchange for a 
perceived gain; if we have ultimate freedom and can decide for ourselves who 
and what we want to be, we might choose to use self-deception to our 





The French mathematician and philosopher, Blaise Pascal, offers us an 
excellent example of such a situation in Note 233 of his Pensees. Pascal 
famously reasoned that it is a better bet to believe in the existence of God than 
not to believe, because if it turned out that God does not exist, then no harm 
would have come from the false belief, whereas if it turned out that God does, 
in fact exist, then the belief would have generated a great deal of good, 
including the assumed reward of entry into Heaven. What is especially 
interesting about ‘Pascal’s Wager’ (as the proposition came to be called), is 
that in order for it to work, the bettor has to consciously set out on a path of 
self-deception. Pascal acknowledges that a person who does not already have 
faith cannot magically will himself to believe, but he maintains that belief can 
be created if certain steps are taken.  
 
His recommendation to the non-believer is simply that he start to imitate the 
actions of true believers – “live as though he had faith” – by doing such things 
as going to church and praying, until eventually he too, would believe (Daston 
1988). Pascal thinks that this is what a reasonable person ought to do since 
there is no way to prove beyond a reasonable doubt whether God exists or not. 
He recognizes that self-deception can be used in the service of what he 
believes is a greater good, or at least the potential for a greater good. This 
qualifies as a case of premeditated self-deception because Pascal encourages 




have believed (remaining agnostic on a position is not belief); whether the 
new belief is true or false is of no consequence. 
 
We have just seen an excellent example of a situation where a person might 
freely allow themselves to be self-deceived, in exchange for a perceived 
advantage. Even so, Sartre’s philosophy does not allow for self-deception 
under any circumstance. He has told us that our freedom is absolute and that it 
is up to us to create our own values, yet puzzlingly, inauthenticity is not an 
option and is always morally wrong. The obvious problem here is that if we 
are truly free to self-create and there really are no objective moral obligations 
placed on us, then we should be unconditionally free to live our lives in any 
way we see fit.  
 
2.4 The Expectation of Complete Authenticity is Dehumanizing 
Another problem we find with the Existential position on authenticity is that it 
holds us to an impossible standard. Anxiety, terror, loneliness and fear are all 
very real experiential aspects of our human condition from which we cannot 
escape, as long as we live. If we accept, as I have argued, that self-deception 
is sometimes used as a survival mechanism to bring much-needed hope and 
meaning into our lives, then we must also acknowledge that, at least to some 
degree, we have the biological potential to occasionally default to a state of 
unawareness about what is really going on in the world around us. If we are at 




does not take this into account cannot get off the ground in any practical 
sense. The idea that we are capable of living lives of perfect authenticity is 
simply not compatible with the realities of what it means to be living a fully 
human existence.  
 
Even if it were possible to live lives of complete authenticity, free of any kind 
of self-deception, it is questionable whether all (or even most) of us would 
find such a life worth living. There is something distinctly dehumanizing 
about a mandate that requires a human being to endure the sometimes extreme 
emotional and psychological pain that is often the inescapable consequence of 
facing up to all the truths of our lives as individuals, as well as to those of 
ourselves in the greater context of being human. Existentialism is 
unapologetically a philosophy that enjoins us to take full inventory of, and 
responsibility for, all facets of our lives which includes acknowledging the 
horrific things that exist alongside the glories of a fully human existence, no 
matter what the situation.  
 
According to Sartre, we must “. . . have a true and lucid consciousness of the 
situation, in assuming the responsibilities and risks that it involves, in 
accepting it in pride or humiliation, sometimes in horror and hate” (Sartre 
1965, 90). In our roles as authentic human beings, we are required to confront 
the truths of our human condition at all times – classic Existential themes such 




godless world, the inescapability of suffering – we must face up to all of these 
things without fleeing into the psychological comfort and safety of self-
deception. Sartre believes that anguish is an inevitable emotional response to 
awareness of all types of freedom. In fact, he simply defines it as the 
“reflective apprehension of freedom” (Sartre 1966, 78). 
 
It is important to note that central to the Existentialist position on authenticity 
is the belief that human beings are capable of, and up to the challenge of 
living fully authentic lives – an idea discussed in more detail in Section Four. 
Even if it were possible to live such a life, however, many of us would suffer 
greatly as a consequence, and a mandate that morally requires us to do so 
must answer to the charge of being dehumanizing. Being able to acknowledge 
the significant features of the human condition and of one’s immediate 
situation without trying to escape into self-deception is certainly a good and 
noble pursuit for those of us who can manage it, but to maintain that this kind 
of confrontation is morally obligatory for everyone is in itself morally 
questionable.  
 
2.5 Decision-Making Is More Important than Consequences  
The last problem we encounter with the Existentialist position on authenticity 
is that Existentialists are more preoccupied with the process of decision 
making than with evaluating resulting actions by reference to objectively 




resulting consequences. “Decisions, they insist, must be made in a fully honest 
way, based on a courageous willingness to acknowledge the significant 
features of the human condition, of one’s immediate situation, and of one’s 
personal responses” (Martin 1986). Their concern is not so much with what 
choices are made as with how they are made. Since we have ultimate freedom 
to create our own values, what is most important is not the actual decisions we 
make, but that we are making all of our decisions consciously, acting from a 
position of full knowledge and authenticity. For Sartre, this means making our 
decisions in ‘good faith’, for in ‘bad faith, “it is from myself that I am hiding 
the truth” (Sartre 1943). For Nietzsche, this means the act of consciously 
‘willing’ something to happen: “But thus I will it; thus shall I will it. Will –
that is the name of the liberator and joy-bringer” (Nietzsche 1966, 139).   
 
This way of thinking is founded on the dangerous belief that the process of 
decision making is more important than the actual choices that are made, and 
by extension, the resulting consequences of those decisions. This is a 
precarious position to support, especially for a philosophy that does not 
believe in objective moral values. If all one need do is claim that a particular 
choice was made in ‘good faith’ (Sartre’s term for authenticity) and no weight 
is placed on the resulting consequences of that choice, then almost any 
decision can be justified. Consequences ought always to be taken into 





3. Sartre and Self-Deception as a Conscious Act 
The importance of Sartre’s belief that all evasions of self-knowledge happen 
consciously cannot be underestimated. In this section, I discuss the theory he 
puts forth in Being and Nothingness where he aims to prove that self-
deception is indeed a conscious act. This is in striking contrast to the popular 
theories of the unconscious mind that were prevalent in his day, especially 
those of Sigmund Freud. It must be noted that Sartre had a great deal invested 
in his theory, for much of his philosophy regarding authenticity relies heavily 
on the central notion that self-deception is something human beings can 
choose to do or not to do. If he is right, then he has justified two of his most 
important contentions: 1) human beings can be held morally responsible for 
their evasions of self-knowledge because they have the freedom to choose to 
do otherwise and 2) it is indeed possible for human beings to live lives of 
complete authenticity. If he is wrong however (as he most certainly seems to 
be) then he has succeeded in justifying neither of these claims, both so central 
to his thought. 
 
I began this thesis with a discussion in Chapter one of the various paradoxes 
that the concept of self-deception seems to raise and outlined a theory put 
forth by Herbert Fingarette which I believe offers the best explanation of what 
is really going on when we self-deceive. All theories of self-deception that 
manage to avoid falling into paradox acknowledge in some way that there are 




for a person to both believe and not believe p at the same time. Fingarette 
asserts that part of the solution is to stop taking explicit consciousness for 
granted and instead start taking its absence for granted, treating explicit 
consciousness as something that only happens when we exercise a ‘specific 
skill for a special reason’ (Fingarette 1969, 36).  This implies that something 
other than full awareness is our default position, and that explicit 
consciousness only springs into action when there is good reason for it to do 
so. Clearly, anything painful or unpleasant that one might have reason to 
repress is not going to be a good candidate for bringing into ‘explicit 
consciousness. 
 
While Sartre predated Fingarette and therefore would not have been aware of 
his work, he was certainly familiar with Freud’s theories of the unconscious 
and emphatically rejected his claims that in self-deception, certain mental 
processes are kept out of our conscious mind by unconscious mechanisms of 
“repression”. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre criticizes Freudian 
psychoanalysis (particularly its concept of the unconscious) in two separate 
discussions. The first is in his discussion of “bad faith” at the beginning of the 
book and the second is in his discussion of his own ‘existential 
psychoanalysis’ on freedom and agency later on (Sartre 1966). Freud’s theory 
of the unconscious was already widely accepted in Sartre’s time and claimed 
that the web of unconscious mental states which is required to explain 




regard unconsciousness as “a regular and inevitable phase in the processes 
constituting our mental activity; every mental act begins as an unconscious 
one, and it may remain so or go on developing into consciousness, according 
as it meets resistance or not”. Far from being true that consciousness is the 
hallmark of the mental, Freud maintained that “what is mental is in itself 
unconscious” (Freud 1949).  
 
Because Sartre rejects Freud’s theory of the unconscious as a solution to the 
problem of the paradoxes that self-deception seems to raise, he is committed 
to accounting for self-deception as an entirely conscious process. As a result, 
the special Sartrian concept of “bad faith” refers to this wholly conscious type 
of self-deception (Wood 1988). The problem of self-deception, as we have 
seen, is that it seems like a contradiction for me to believe p and yet at the 
same time and in the same respect to disbelieve p. Sartre claims that these two 
apparently contradictory states are really compatible and argues this through 
an appeal to something allegedly special about the nature of believing and 
disbelieving. “The true problem of bad faith comes evidently from the fact 
that bad faith is faith,” that is, belief. “But if we take belief as the adherence of 
belief to its object when the object is not given, or is given indistinctly, then 
bad faith is belief, and the essential problem of bad faith is a problem of 





Sartre maintains that the typical case of belief is one in which belief is 
combined with disbelief. “To believe is not to believe,” he declares. “No 
belief is enough belief. One never believes what one believes . . . no belief, 
strictly speaking, is ever able to believe enough” (Sartre 1966). Some sense 
can be made of this if we recognize that Sartre is alluding to what might be 
called the imperfection of beliefs, taking that term in its etymological 
meaning. That is, he is describing belief as a project that all too often fails, 
which falls short and is consciously left incomplete, owing to the unfortunate 
circumstances of our lives. When this happens, what we are left with as 
beliefs are things that are made to do the job of beliefs but which we 
recognize as insufficient to do this job. Insofar as what must serve as the 
belief that p is forced to serve in this capacity it may be said that I believe p. 
But insofar as I recognize this same item as insufficient to do the job of a 
belief, I consciously disbelieve p. As a result, it can be simultaneously true 
that I believe p and that I disbelieve p, since my disbelieving p does not entail 
that it is false that I believe p (Wood 1988).  
 
Freud and Fingarette are in agreement that self-deception takes place at an 
unconscious level and both offer theories that are much more plausible and 
convincing than Sartre’s. There is no good reason why the workings of our 
mind might not be better explained by a theory that attributes unconscious 
mental states to us rather than by one that limits itself to conscious mental 




authenticity and self-deception as they take away his justification for two of 
his most important premises – that self-deceivers are morally responsible for 
their evasions of self-knowledge, and that living a life of complete 






4. Why Authenticity Might Have Come to Be Viewed as the 
Supreme Value 
 
It is often thought that authenticity is the supreme value and that nothing can 
morally justify evading or not telling the truth, even though people do it all the 
time. Even so, I have come to the surprising (and counter-intuitive) conclusion 
that it is often easier to justify being inauthentic than authentic, with the added 
irony that this is in no small part thanks to some of the arguments presented 
by the Existentialists themselves, meant to justify the opposite. All too often, 
we find ourselves defending truth for its own sake, which has its obvious 
limitations. Why then, do so many of us have such a strong intuition that truth 
is always the supreme value when, at the very least, and as I hope this paper 
has shown, it is not a simple issue? I think the question is important enough to 
warrant at least minor consideration, and I would like to make the suggestion 
that the widespread emergence of the belief that authenticity is the supreme 
value is a product of modernity, at least in part a consequence of the two-fold 
influences of the 19th century emergence of psychology, and the proliferation 
of Existentialist thought and writing. 
 
4.1 The Emergence of Psychology 
The birth of modern psychology in the late 19th century emphasized the 
importance of digging deep into our psyches to probe the riches of truth that 
lay buried there, beneath the layers of repression and self-deceit. According to 




knowledge of the unconscious activities of the mind” (Welsh 1994). To live in 
a state of denial was to be sick, while to confront and accept the truth was to 
be cured. The human mind was the new frontier, and it appeared to be 
knowable too. Psychoanalysis became all the rage, as it passed on a legacy 
that continues to this day, where the therapist’s couch still remains the 
metaphorical workbench for ‘knowing thyself’.   
 
At the same time that psychologists were busy probing the depths of the 
human mind for the common good, they were also becoming increasingly 
aware of the great lengths to which the human body and mind would go to 
keep some truths from becoming conscious. Repressed memories, 
transference of feelings and beliefs, split and multiple personalities – all these 
phenomena were emerging as iron defences against the surfacing of certain 
truths. Surely something important was at work here: common wisdom might 
have told us that the truth would set us free, but our bodies were telling us 
something entirely different.  
 
4.2 The Rise of Existentialism 
The second major influence that I believe helped shape our modern ideas 
about authenticity, was the emergence of Existentialist thought in the 19th 
century. In many ways, Existentialism was just as much a literary 
phenomenon as a philosophical one.  Sartre’s ideas were – and still are – 




through his more purely philosophical ones such as Being and 
Nothingness, and Critique of Dialectical Reason. Many Existential writers 
objected to traditional systematic or academic philosophy, claiming that it was 
too abstract in both style and content to really be addressing concrete human 
experience. Because of this distaste for more traditional philosophical tracts, 
most Existential thought can be found expressed in literature. Dostoyevsky, 
Sartre, Camus, Nietzsche, Kafka – they all wrote books and short stories, 
creating fictional contexts within which to give their ideas form.  
 
The problem with literature is that it is not subjected to the same rules of clear 
argument that academic philosophy is. Even more slippery is the fact that 
literature can, and does, rely heavily on eliciting an emotional response from the 
reader, which can often be manipulated and contrived, all the while contributing 
to the obfuscation of the actual ideas themselves. There are characters and 
feelings, situations and events, elements not normally found in more traditional 
philosophical tracts, where ideas are presented as transparently as possible. 
Certainly literature, with all its devices and powers of persuasion, has its place, 
but one must be careful not to be swayed by style over substance, which is 
sometimes a risk.  
 
If we are to take its philosophical ideas seriously, then no work of fiction can 
be allowed to escape our scrutiny. If we have had an emotional response to it, 




withstand a vigorous examination, removed from their fictional context. It is 
my view that many Existential ideas (the most important of which is the 
notion that authenticity is the supreme value), were able to take root in the 
popular imagination precisely because they were presented within works of 
fiction. This made their appeal mass, but also assured that there was little 
opportunity for any criticism or objection to reach non-academic audiences, 
leaving the seeds planted but the ideas largely unchallenged. The Existential 
position on authenticity is one that stands up well in theory, but fares far less 
well in practice—not unlike many things that can survive and thrive within a 
work of fiction, but could never exist beyond the page.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I further supported my contention that authenticity is not the 
supreme value by mounting a direct challenge to its most ardent defenders, the 
Existentialists. I gave an overview of the Existentialist position on authenticity 
and self-deception and identified several problems that the position seems to 
raise, looking specifically at the work of Sartre and Nietzsche. The five 
difficulties I identified are: 1) the problem of absolute truth 2) the problem of 
absolute freedom 3) the problem of self-creation 4) the problem of 
dehumanizing expectations 5) the problem of decision-making being valued 
over consequences.  In Section 3, I outlined Sartre’s theory that all evasions of 
self-knowledge are conscious, and explained why his being correct on this 




chapter and this thesis with some suggestions as to why so many people might 
have come to believe that authenticity is the supreme value, when a closer 









In Chapter One, I began by making the case that self-deception is indeed a 
real phenomenon, as the concept has raised so many apparent paradoxes that 
many scholars have rejected that it is even possible. I defined what we mean 
when we use the term ‘self-deception’ and then looked at the role that 
consciousness plays in most discussions of the morality of self-deception. I 
then discussed the problem of paradoxes, applying an argument presented by 
Herbert Fingarette to try to resolve the epistemological dichotomies that the 
concept of self-deception seems to raise.  
 
In Chapter Two, I argued that self-deception can be rational if we take a 
means-ends view of rationality and emphasize its usefulness in serving 
legitimate, non-harmful desires, wants, needs, and values other than those 
involved in a concern for truth. I then made the case that under certain 
circumstances it can be morally permissible to deceive oneself, especially 
when the deception is contributing to one’s physical and mental well-being. I 
also argued that it can occasionally be morally permissible to allow the self-
deception of others to go unchallenged, especially in cases where the 
opportunity to exercise compassion, empathy, and kindness towards each 
other takes precedence over a concern for truth. I then took the argument one 
step further and claimed that attacking or trying to remove another person’s 





In Chapter Three, I confronted self-deception’s staunchest opponents, the 
Existentialists, who maintain that self-deception is never morally permissible 
under any circumstances. I began the chapter with a general outline of the 
Existentialist position on authenticity and identified several problems that the 
position seems to raise, looking specifically at the work of Sartre and 
Nietzsche. The five difficulties I identified are: 1) the problem of absolute 
truth 2) the problem of absolute freedom 3) the problem of self-creation 4) the 
problem of dehumanizing expectations 5) and the problem of decision-making 
being valued over consequences.  I then considered Sartre’s argument in 
support of his belief that all evasions of self-knowledge are conscious and 
explained why this point is so important to his contentions that self-deceivers 
are morally responsible for their deceptions and that human beings are capable 
of living lives of complete authenticity. I concluded the chapter, and this 
thesis, with some suggestions as to why so many people might have come to 
believe that authenticity is the supreme value, when a closer investigation 
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